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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH 
ST'ATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent, 
-vs.-
THEODORE SAMUEL PACHECO, 
Appellant. 
STATEl\fENT O:B~ CASE 
Case No. 
17342 
The appellant, The·odore Samuel Pacheco, was 
charged and convicted of grand larceny and second 
degree burglary, in violation of 76-38-1-4, U.C.A. 1953, 
and 76-9-3, U.C.A. 1953, respectively, in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, on 3 May, 
1961, and no\Y appeals from that conviction. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A verdict finding the appellant guilty of the crimes 
of grand larceny and second degree burglary was re-
turned by the jury on 3 May, 1961, and appellant was 
committed to the State Prison on 4 May, 1961. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the convictions alleging 
the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction of 
larceny, and that the burglary conviction should he 
vitiated by virtue of juror misconduct and a claim of 
entrapment; the State contends no basis for reversal 
exists of record. 
ST'ATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent, State of Utah, will adopt the appel-
lant's Statement of Facts, but \vill supplement the state-
ment in rebuttal to the points of argument raised by 
the appellant where necessary for clarification. 
STATENIENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE 
LARCENY CONVICTION. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT LET THE JURY SEPARATE 
AFTER DELIBERA'TION, AND THE APPELLANT HAS 
WAIVED ANY RIGHT TO OBJECT. 
POINT III. 
NO EVIDENCE OF ENTRAPMENT EXISTS WARRANT-
ING REVERSAL. 
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ARGlT:MENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE 
LARCENY CONVICTION. 
The appellant contends that there is insufficient 
evidence of record to sustain the conviction of larceny 
of the nwney from the Payless Builders Supply Co. 
The basis of the contention is that there is no showing 
that the appellant had possession of any of the money 
at the time he was searched at the ·scene. It appe,ars 
that the trial judge denied the appellant's motion to 
dismiss on the theory that the accomplices' possession 
was sufficient. (R. 123). The defendant contends that 
since one of the appellant's co-participants, Gerald D. 
Shelton, did not intend to commit a crime, that his 
acts cannot be in1puted to the appellant and, therefore, 
the evidence of possession is not sufficient of record. 
At the outset it is to he noted that exclusive, con-
scious "possession," as such, is not itself an element of 
the crime of larceny, but is merely evidentiary under 
76-38-1, U.C.A. 1953, of the required element of the 
"taking'' of possession. The possession is indicative 
of the asportation and the taking of possession, which 
are the essential elements of larceny. People v. Gillis, 
6 Utah 84, 21 Pac. -!0-± (1889); Clark & 11arshall, Crimes, 
6th Ed. (1958), p. 706, et seq. The absence of possession 
also may be son1e indication of the absence of taking 
possession. The cases of Sta,te v. Dyett, 114 Utah 379, 
199 P.2d 153 (1948) and State v. Brooks, 101 Utah 584, 
126 P.2d 1044 (19-±2), cited by the appellant, are material 
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only if possession is the only evidence of record sufficient 
to show an actual taking by the appellant. The record 
shows that Gerald' D. Shelton testified to the appellant's 
taking possession of some of the money; he testified 
as follows: (R.177). 
"Q. Now there was a small cash box, a metal cash 
box there, was there not~ 
A. Yes, there was. 
* * * 
Q. Who opened that cash box~ 
A. I think Markham tried to open it. I had my 
hack turned because Ted was going through 
some papers in this other drawer. I think 
~1:arkham tried to open it and I was holding 
it when he opened it. 
Q. Did you open that cash box~ 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Did you take any money out of it and give it 
to Markham~ 
A. I took a bunch of envelopes out of it that Ted 
said there was son1e money in, and Markham 
took smne of it and Ted took so1ne of it and 
I took some of it.'' 
Thus the evidence directly shows that smne of the money 
was actually taken by the appellant. The appellant oon-
tends that since there was no showing at the time he was 
searched by the police at the pre1nises burglarized, that 
he had possession of any of the 1noney, that it indicates 
a non-taking. This is not adequately supported by the 
record, for at the time the appellant was searched, the 
police were not looking for any money, but rather for a 
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weapon. Thus, David T. llill, a private policeman, testi-
fied: (R. 97). 
'' Q. Now you indicated that you, together with 
another officer, did have the occasion to 
search the defendant in this case~ 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And is it also your testimony that you found 
only a small pocket knife together with some 
keys~ 
A. No-I didn't say keys. The only thing, as I 
recall, that I took off the man was the small 
pocket knife. I don't remember exactly how 
long it was. It was a small pocket knife. I 
don't even remember how many blades. The 
only thing I tvas looking for at the time-and 
I shook him good-was some type of toeapon. 
That was the only thing I took from the 
fellow.'' 
In addition, Officer Don G. Ferguson testified that 
he only "frisked" the appellant. (R. 121). The~refore, 
there is nothing to overwhelmingly rebut Gerald D. Shel-
ton's testimony that the appellant took some of the 
money. Even if it is assu1ned that at the time he was 
searched he had none of the $124.67 that was taken in 
his possession, it still does not rebut the taking, since he 
could have gotten rid of it or given it to the third accom-
plice, Johnny l\[arkham. This would have been sufficient 
asportation to satisfy that element of the crime. People 
v. Gillis, supra; Clark & ::Marshall, Crimes, 6th Ed. (1958), 
p. 738. Under these circumstances, the evidence of taking 
possession is sufficient to sustain the conviction. 
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Even if it were determined that the evidence is in-
sufficient to demonstrate an actual taking of a suffi-
cient amount for grand larceny by the appellant himself, 
it is submitted that the trial court correctly ruled on the 
issue of in1puting the conduct of the accomplices to the 
appellant. In People v. Collins, 53 Cal. 185 (1878), the 
court held that one who merely pretends to aid another 
in order to get evidence is not guilty of burglary and an 
entry by that person cannot be in1puted to the other. In 
People v. Lanzit, 70 Cal. App. 498, 233 Pac. 816 (1924), 
the court said, with reference to imputation of conduct by 
a feigned accomplice to an accused: 
"It is of course necessary that the defendant 
should have directly participated in so much of 
the entire transaction that the acts which he him-
self personally committed shall alone b€ sufficient 
to n1ake out a complete offense against the law; 
for no act of the feigned accon1plice may he im-
puted to hin1, and if in order to constitute the of-
fense, it is necessary that smnething done by the 
supposed confederate shall be imputed to the ac-
cused, then the prosecution will fail." 
To the same effect is State 'C. J an.sen, 22 Kan. 498, 
and in United States v. Buck, 3 U.S:C.nl.A. 3±1, 12 C:M.:R 
97 (1953), Chief Justice Quinn writing the opinion for 
the Court of Military Appeals, said: 
''It is necessary to show that he participated 
in every essential act necessary to constitute the 
cri1ne, howeve.r, for obviously no act of the decoy 
can be i1npu,ted to him, because they do not share 
a cmnmon criminal intent or purpose. The one 
intends a crime, while the other seeks only to 
apprehend the criminal." 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
See also Perkins, Criminal Law, p. 921-2. 
The essential factor of these cases is that the acts 
of a decoy or fejgned accornplice may not be imputed 
to the defendant. In this case, the acts of Gerald D. Shel-
ton cannot be irnputed to the appellant under this theory; 
however, Johnny J\{arkham was not a feigned accomplice 
or decoy; he was an actual accomplice with the appellant, 
and, hence, because appellant and Markham had a com-
nlon purpose and intent, their acts are imputable to each 
other. By the appellant's own testimony (R. 157), he 
and Markham intended to take money from the Payless 
Builders Supply and entered for that purpose. There was 
a tmity of intent and action between appellant and Mark-
ham, and appellant testified the money was given to 
Markham. (R. 158). 'Vhen Markham was searched, the 
sum of $80.70 was taken from him (R.109), and the above 
quoted testimony of Shelton and appellant's own testi-
Inony supports J\Iarkham having taking some of the Pay-
less money. Since 1farkham's actions are not those of the 
decoy, they may be imputed to appellant and suffice to 
support the conviction for larceny. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT LE'T THE JURY SEPARATE 
AFTER DELIBERATION, AND THE APPELLANT HAS 
WAIVED ANY RIGHT TO OBJECT. 
The appellant's contention that the court allowed 
the jury to separate after submission of the case to the 
jury is not \Yell taken for it assumes that the case was 
-I 
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in fact submitted to the jury prior to their separation for 
lunch. 
The only reference in the record to the alleged sepa-
ration of the jury shows that after the charge and argu-: 
ments of counsel, the court addressed the jury as follows: 
(R. 204). 
''T·HE COURT: J\frs. Gunn, and gentlemen 
of the jury, as you have observed I am trying two 
cases here in effect at once. I have this other 
coming at two o'clock and I have to have a noon 
hour, and in order to have it I can't wait here 
while you are deliberating. So I am going to ex-
cuse you for your noon hour. I'm going to excuse 
you until 1 :30 this afternoon and ask that you 
return at that time, and that you very carefully 
keep in mind your conduct, as I have indicated 
is your duty, and at that time I will send you out 
to deliberate on the issues in this matter." 
No objection to the court's actions was voiced by the 
appellant. 77-31-27, U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
"The jurors sworn to try a cri1ninal action 
Inay, at any time before the subn1ission of the 
case to the jury, in the discretion of the court be 
permitted to separate or be kept in charge by a 
proper officer." 
The in1portant part of the statute is the word "sub-
mission." If the case is aut01natically submitted to the 
jury after charge and argun1ent, without further action 
of the court, then the appellant's contention that sepa-
ration occurred after submission may be correct. How-
ever, if submission of the case does not occur until the 
judge directs the jury to their deliberations, then the jury 
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in the instant case could not have been said to have sepa-
rated subsequent to sub1nission. It is submitted that 77-
31-32, U.C.A. 1953, does not support a contention that 
the Legislature dee1ned the case submitted on completion 
of the charge, but rather the statute merely recognizes 
that under Utah practice the charge usually is the last 
ad preceding the jury's deliberation. 
77-32-1, U.C.A. 1953 seems to recognize that the trial 
is still in progress until the jury retires for deliberation. 
77-32-1-4, U.C.A. 1953, are equally as susceptible to the 
contention that the ease must be submitted by the judge 
to the jury for deliberation as is 77-31-32, U.C.A. 1953 
to the contrary. It is submitted that the Legislature, 
in 77-31-27, U.C.A. 1953, by using the word" submission," 
meant that ti1ne of the trial that the judge surrenders 
the matter to the jury's determination. The danger of 
influence is no greater before commencing delibHration 
just because the charge has been given than prior there-
to. The real danger sought to be avoided is outside in-
fluence upon the jury, and after commencement of de-
liberations, the chance for harm is greatest. As is noted 
in 21 ALR 2d 1093, "the trend of the decisions is away 
from a strict and technical approach to the question." 
Once the jury has entered into deliberations the minds 
and views of the jurors are expressed, and influence 
at this time may result in over-emphasis of evidence, 
or coercion, that could persuade the jury to a result where 
prior to deliberation they have no dominion over the 
result, and communications are less susceptible to causing 
mass coercion or influence. Therefore, it is contended 
that a case should not be deemed submitted until court 
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directs the jury to enter into its deliberations. This ac-
cords with decisions from other states; thus as was noted 
in 34 A.L.R. 1210 : 
"A case is finally submitted to the jury, with-
in the meaning of a statute forbidding their sepa-
ration when the case is finally submitted, at such 
time as the court directs the jury to enter upon its 
de1iberations and not necessarily at the conclusion 
of the charge of the court to them.'' 
See also 21 ALR 2d 1139 ; 79 ALR 836. 
77-31-27, U.C.A. 1953, allows separation at any time 
"before the subn1ission of the case to the jury.'' In State 
v. Ferrell, 69 Ohio St. 69 N.E. 995 (1903), the Ohio Su-
preme Court had a case before it similar to the one now 
before the court. The court, in that case, allowed the jury 
after receiving the charge, to go for their noon meal. The 
Ohio Appellate Court found no error. In commenting 
on an Ohio statute similar to that of Utah, the Ohio 
Court said: 
''We think the natural inference is that it was 
intended to ren1ove the iron clad rule and leave 
s01ne discretion in the trial judge as to when he 
would finally submit the case." 
In State v. 1-1 endricks, 32 I{an. 559, 4 Pac. 1050 and 
State v. JJ1cKimney, 31 I{an. 570, 3 Pac. 356, the court 
said it \vas not error to allo-vv the jury to separate at any 
time before committed to the custody of the bailiff. 
It is admitted that a split of authority exists in this 
area, 23A CJS, Criminal Law, p. 959, and some authority 
exists to support appellant's contention. Page v. State, 
10 
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______ Old. Cr ....... , 332 P.:2d G93 (1958). However, it is sub-
mitted that onl~· h~· holding that submission is accom-
plished upon the court directing the jury to commence 
deliberations can the trial judge maintain adequate con-
trol over the trial, and avoid unforeseen problems that 
1nay require additional attention after the charge, but 
before deliberation. 
It is sub1nitted that even if it were deemed error in 
the instant case to have allowed the jury to separate 
for lunch, the appellant nmy not now complain since no 
objection \vas raised either by appellant or counsel to the 
separation. Counsel had full opportunity to object, both 
before and after separation, but no objection was voiced. 
In such circumstances as this, the courts have recog-
nized that an accused cannot sit back and acquiesce in 
the separation and thereafter claim error. Abbott, Crimi-
nal Trial Pracice, 4th Ed., Sec. 691. In VVharton's Crim-
inal Law and Procedure, Sec. 2108, it is said: 
"Ordinarily the defendant must make prompt 
objection to the separation or he will be deemed to 
have \\·aived any objection thereto." 
A substantial a1nount of authority has recognized 
the necessity of counsel or the accused to object. 21 ALR 
2d 1149. In Walker v. State, 71 Ga. App. 38, 29 S.E. 2d 
819 (1944), it was held that the defendant's failure to ob-
ject operated as an implied consent where the jury was 
allowed to go to hmch after submission. 
In Keith '0·. Conmwnu.;ealth, ______ Ky ....... , 243 S.W. 
293 (1922), the J(entucky Court of Appeals had a claim 
11 
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of error before it where the trial court allowed the jury 
to separate for the noon meal; in holding the right to 
complain to have been waived, the court said: 
''If appellant had objected to the separation 
of the jury at the time the court allowed it, or if 
he had moved the court at any time before verdict 
for a discharge of the jury, it would have been 
~ reversible error to have overruled the objection 
and motion. IIaving failed to pursue this course 
he waived, as he had a right to do, the error." 
Even those jurisdictions that have accepted the rule 
that a case is submitted after charge, have found that 
where counsel and the accused sit quietly by and allow 
the jury to he separated, they have waived .any right to 
complain. Thus, in Hobson v. State, 277 P.2d 695 (Okla. 
Cr. 1954), the court allowed the jury to separate for lunch 
after beginning their deliberations. The accused and 
defense counsel remained silent while the trial judge 
announced his intentions, and the Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals found a waiver, noting: 
"But in the ·within case there was no specific 
waiver entered of reeord. Could there be a waiver 
by implication~ The record is clear that both 
counsel for the State and counsel for the defend-
ant were present ·when the court announced his 
intention of pern1itting the jurors to separate and 
go to their separate places for lunch. No objection 
was n1ade at the tin1e, as he:retofore reeited, 
though there was full opportunity. The matter 
of permitting the jurors to separate was a matter 
of procedure, amounting to an irregularity, which 
must be taken advantage of by exception. It is 
true that the defendant had the right to have the 
jury kept together after final submission until 
12 
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they agreed upon a verdict or were discharged by 
the court, but the right coming within the classi-
fication of those rights that can be waived, as 
heretofore determined, the defendant and his 
counsel by failure to raise the question at the time 
the court announced his intention of permitting 
the jury to separate, are deemed to have acqui-
esced, and objections interposed for the first time 
on a motion for new trial, came too late.'' 
Nor can appellant claim that he could not object without 
offending the jury, since a prope·r objection could have 
been made out of their hearing. Martin v. State, 222 P.2d 
534 (Okla. Crim. 1950). 
It is submitted that there is no merit to the appel-
lant's contention of jury misconduct. 
POINT Ill. 
NO EVIDENCE OF ENTRAPMENT EXISTS WARRANT-
lNG REVERSAL. 
The appellant's final contention is that his conviction 
for all offenses should be set aside because his commis-
sion of the crimes was the result of entrapment. The evi-
dence bearing on the issue of entrapment shows that some 
time prior to the commission of the burglary and larceny 
on 12 December 1960 at Payless Builders Supply, Officer 
Gary Parks had several conversations with Gerald D. 
Shelton, and that on the 11th of December, 1960, Shelton 
told Parks that the defendant and Markham "had ap-
proached him with the idea of commiting a burglary.'' 
(R.128). The burglary was to be of Ream's Bargain 
Center in South Salt Lake. (R. 128). Parks asked Shel-
13 
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ton to verify the information as to the proposed robbery. 
Parks testified that Shelton was not an undercover or 
agent for the City Police. (R. 130, 131). Parks testified 
that he did not receive any calls or notice from Shelton 
as to the Payless burglary, but that he heard certain 
information on the police radio that caused him to go to a 
gas station where Shelton had left a note and then on to 
the Payless Builders Supply Co. where the appellant, 
Shelton and Markham had been apprehended. Parks had 
been called by the appellant, and on cross-examination 
testified as follows : (R. 136). 
"BY J\1R. LEARY: 
Q. J\rfr. Parks, you are acquainted with Mr. Gery 
Shelton, aren't you~ Gerald Shelton~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you on Decemoor 11, 1960, ask 1fr. Shel-
ton to set up a burglary so that Mr. Pacheco 
and Mr. J\1arkham could be caught~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you encourage him in any way~ 
A. No, sir. 
* * * 
Q. Did you tell Mr. Shelton on the 11th day of 
December or any day prior thereto, that :Mr. 
Markham and J\1r. Pacheco, or induce J\1r. 
Markham or :rvfr. Pacheco to burglarize Pay-
less Builders Supply~ 
A. No, sir. 
* * * 
Q. Now did you induce Mr. Shelton to commit 
the burglary on the Payless Builders Supply 
in the summer of 1960 ~ 
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A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you suggest to him that he commit a bur-
glary at the Payless Builders Supply~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you believe that he induced J\!Ir. Pacheco 
to commit a burglary on the morning of De-
cember 12, 1960 ~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Now, in truth and in fact, you suspected that 
a burglary might be committed at Reams Bar-
gain Annex on the night or morning of De-
cember 11th or 12th, 1960, didn't you~ 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Now you had asked l\Ir. Shelton, had you not, 
_Mr. Parks, if he had any information con-
cerning any burglaries to notify you by phone, 
is that correct~ 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And you therefore gave him your telephone 
number, is that correct~ 
A. That's correct. Yes. 
Q. Did you make any promises to Mr. Shelton 
concerning any crime that he may have par-
ticipated in as to whether he would or would 
not be prosecuted~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. That is all." 
The substance of Officer Park's testimony was that 
he told Shelton to keep him informed of possible burglar-
ies that 1nay involve the appellant. (R.l41). Finally, on 
redirect he testified: (R.142). 
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'' Q. Did you at any time prior to the Pay less 
Builders Supply incident, use your influence 
or the influence of your office to permit Ger-
ry Shelton to continue his driving of his pri-
vate vehicle~ 
A. No, sir." 
The appellant testified that he was a convicted felon 
(R. 144), and that he had conversations with Shelton 
about the possibility of committing a crime. (R. 145). He 
testified that he and Shelton had discussed burglarizing 
the Equitable Life Insurance Co., Ream's Bargain Base-
ment, and an A & W Root Beer stand, and that these 
conversations took place on 11 December, 1960, the day 
before the Payless Builders burglary. (R. 147). Later 
that night Shelton contacted the appellant and asked 
about the burglary, and appellant testified he told Shel-
ton, "Not at this time," with reference to the burglary. 
After a few moments of riding around in the appellant's 
car, they arrived at Ream's Bargain Center. The appel-
lant testified (R: 149') : 
"A. V\Then we got to Reams Bargain Center and I 
said 'No,' and Johnny said 'No,' Gerry said, 
'Well, ·what about the other one?' He said, 
'What about the Payless Lumber?' And I 
to1d him, 'Well, we'll go down there and see.' " 
Appellant further testified it was Shelton who suggested 
the possible burglaries (R. 151), but that the places 
suggested were not favorable to him. (R. 152). On di-
rect examination the follo·wing testimony was elicited: 
(R.152). 
"Q. Now, 1\fr. Pacheco, when Mr. Shelton sug-
gested that you go down to Rea1ns, and then 
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when that didn't work that you go down to 
Payless Builders Supply, what made you go 
along with him~ 
A. Well, partly because it was myself but three 
fourths of it was his own reputation. 
Q. Mr. Shelton's reputation~ 
A. That's right." 
On cross-examination, the appellant testified: (R. 157). 
"Q. Well, what was your particular purpose in 
breaking in there~ 
A. Well my purpose to break in there~ 
Q. Yes, your purpose. 
A. Because it was offered to you." 
He testified to breaking and entering to steal money 
(R. 158), and that he intended to avoid the police. He 
testified : ( R. 158). 
"A. What do you mean, I wouldn't have told 
anybody about it~ 
Q. Vv ell I mean you wouldn't have told any 
officers about it~ 
A. I don't think anybody would have. 
* * * 
Q. Well you just all went over there, and you 
just broke in, is that right~ 
A. No. I had been talking about it before." 
Appellant testified further that he went on the burglary 
because he ·was "asked to go," and further: (R.160). 
''Q. And nobody forced you to go down there, did 
they~ 
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A. Nobody forced me to do anything. 
Q. And' you went down there because you wanted 
to go down~ 
A. I went down because I wanted to go down 
there." 
Appellant testified he was not offered money to commit 
the burglary. (R. 161). 
Gerald D. Shelton was also called as a defense wit-
ness and testified that he had a conversation with the 
appellant the day before the burglary. He testified to 
the substance of the conversation as follows: (R. 163). 
''A. Yes. He was talking, Ted, we was talking 
about hitting some place, about burglarizing 
some place, and I says, 'Okay, I'll go vnth 
you.' 
Q. And that was the extent of the conversation~ 
A. Yes.'' 
Shelton further testified that he contacted Officer 
Parks the day before the burglary and informed him of 
the planned incident. Parks told him to go ahead, that 
he would be protected. (R. 165). Shelton's testimony, 
however, was that the appellant induced and conceived 
of the burglary (R. 167), and that he just went along. 
He testified on cross-examination that he never suggested 
to the appellant or Markham the commission of the bur-
glary. (R. 171). In this particular the record shows the 
following: (R. 172). 
"Q. Did you ever encourage either Mr. Pacheco or 
1\ir. I\iarkham to burglarize or attempt to 
burglarize Reams Bargain Annex' 
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A. We had talked about it, but I never encour-
aged it. 
Q. Did you ever suggest the burglary at Payless 
Builders Supply Company 1 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Did you ever induce Mr. Pacheco to even 
commit a burglary at the Payless on the 
morning of December 12, 1960 ~ 
~1R. :MITSVNAGA: I object to that. I believe 
it calls for a-
THE COURT: 1Nell, he may answer. 
Q. Did you ever encourage Mr. Pacheco to com-
mit the burglary at the Payless Builders 
Supply on the morning of December 12, 1960 ~ 
A. No, I didn't. V\T e had talked about it but I 
didn't encourage it. 
Q. \Vas it your idea that you burglarize the Pay-
less Builders Supply Company on the morn-
ing of December 12, 1960 ~ 
A. No. 
Q. When did you first talk about the burglary 
of Payless Builders Supply~ 
A. It was after this Reams Food Bargain Center 
-Ted said he knew of another place that we 
had hit before that he wanted to do. 
And further: (R. 173). 
''Q. ~Ir. Pacheco said 'I know of another place 
that I burglarized before. Let's go do it? Is 
that right~ 
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A. That's right. 
Q. And you did go there, didn't you~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now did :Mr. Parks of the Salt Lake City 
Police Department tell you to induce Mr. 
Pacheco to commit a burglary~ 
A. No. 
Q. Did he tell you to encourage Mr. Pacheco-
A. No. 
Q.-to commit a burglary, any burglary~ 
A. No, he did not. 
Q. Did he ever offer you any money if you en-
couraged or induced Mr. Pacheco to commit 
any burglaries~ 
A. No, he did not." 
The substance of Shelton's testimony was that appellant 
conceived of the burglary, and' that he, Shelton, went 
along after informing the police, but that he did not en-
courage the burglary nor did Officer Parks encourage 
him to encourage others to commit the crime. 
The above testimony, it is submitted, conclusively 
shows that no entrapment was comnritted, and that the 
trial court gratuitously allowed an instruction on the 
1natter where none was warranted. 
In Salt Lake City v. Robinson, 40 Utah 448, 125 Pac. 
657 (1912), the Supreme Court, although not character-
izing the defense as one of "entrapment,'' set down a 
silnilar substantive test as to when a conviction was to 
be vitiated because of police inducement. The court said: 
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''No doubt if public offices have induced or 
procured a defendant to commit a burglary or lar-
ceny or other offense which he did not intend to 
cOinmit nor would have committed except for 
the induce1nent of such officer, public policy will 
not justify a conviction for an offense committed 
under such circumstances." 
The rule followed in State v. McCornish, 59 Utah 58, 
201 Pac. 637 ('19·21) ; and found not applicable to the facts 
of State v. Franco, 76 Utah 202, 289 Pac. 100 (1930). 
Thus it can be said that entrapment is a recognized' doc-
trine in U tah.1 The rule is the same as that applied in 
other cases. In Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 
(1958), the United States Supre:me Court stated: 
"However, the fact that government agents 
'merely afford opportunities or facilities for the 
commission of the offense does not constitute en-
trapment. Entrapment occurs only when the 
criminal conduct was the 'product of the creative 
activity' of law enforcement officials." 
r:rhe Nevada Supreme Court in In re Wright, 68 Nev. 
324, 232 P.2d 398 (1951) defined entrapment as follows: 
"Entrapinent is the seduction or improper 
inducement to commit a crime for the purpose of 
instituting a criminal prosecution, but if a person 
1. Entrapment is not recognized in all jurisdictions. Thus 
New York does not recognize it, People v. Schacher, 48 NYS 2d 
371 (1944) nor Tennessee, Goins v. State, 192 Tenn. 32, 237 S.W. 
2d 8 (1950). Florida has partially abolished it by statute, 22 Fla. 
Stat. Ann., Sec. 838.11 (1957). It is questionable as to whether 
several other common law purisdictions approve of the American 
rule as such. Browning v. JWH Wats.on, 1 WLR 1172, 2 All E.R. 
775 (195'3 England); Smith v. O'Donovan, 28 NZLR 94 (1908 
New Zealand); Marsh v. Johnston (1959) Crim. L.R. 444 (Scot-
land) contra: R. v. Nothout (1912), CPD 1037 (South AF). 
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in good faith and for the purpose of detecting 
or discovering a crime or offense furnishes the 
opportunity for the commission thereof by one 
who has the requisite criminal intent it is not en-
trapment." 
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has de-
fined the concept of entrapment in Crosbie v. State, 330 
P.2d 602 (1958 Okla. Cr.) as follows: 
"Entrapment is the planning of an offense 
by an officer, or someone acting under his direc-
tion, and his procurement by improper inducement 
of its commission by one who would not have 
perpetrated it except for the trickery of the offi-
cer.'' 
Thus there appear to be two essential elements to the de-
fense of entrapment: (1) the unlawful inducement, and 
( 2) the commission of the crime as the direct result of the 
trickery and not the result of a willingness or precon-
ceived criminal intent. United States v. Sherman, 200 F. 
2d 880 ( 1952). In determining whether the police induce-
ment provided the unlawful intent, Justice Learned Hand 
said in United States v. Sherman, 200 F. 2d 880, 882: 
"(I)t is a valid reply to the defense, if the 
prosecution can satisfy the jury that the accused 
was ready and willing to commit the offense 
charged, whenever the opportunity offered." 
It is also the generally accepted rule in the n1ajority 
of jurisdictions that evidence of previous convictions 
and misconduct of the same may be considered in deter-
mining the "ready cmnpliance" or "criminal design" of 
the defendant. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 
451 (1932); 49 Jnl. Crim. & Pol. Sci., 447, 450. 
22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
By applying the above noted rules to the instant 
situation, it appears clear that the defendant was not 
entrapped. Both Officer Parks and Gerald Shelton testi-
fied that the original idea to burglarize Reams market 
and Payless Builders came from the defendant. Both 
testified that they in no way encouraged the crimes to 
be comn1itted. The defendant's own testimony shows that 
he was not forced to go along, but committed the crimes 
readily because he was "asked to." He was not induced 
over a long period of time, but rather, assuming that 
Shelton suggested the idea, the appeilant readily com-
plied. His objection to burglarizing Reams Market was 
not because of a lack of criminal desire, but rather be'"" 
cause he felt Payless Builders would be better. The issue 
of entrapn1ent is one for the jury, United States v. Mark-
ham, 191 F. 2d 936 (1951), unless as a matter of l'aw it 
appears that entrapment was present. United States v. 
Sherman, 356 U.S. 369 (1958). The jury could well have 
believed Parks and Shelton that the criminal conduct 
originated ·with the appellant; hence sufficient evidence 
to sustain the conviction in spite of the entrapment plea 
exists, and the jury's decision must be upheld. Berchtold 
r. State, 11 Ftah 208, 357 P. 2d 183 (1960). Even were the 
appellant's testimony believed in full, the second element 
for the defense of entrapment is expressly negatived by 
appellant's ready compliance. For this reason the trial 
court's instruction placing the defense in issue for the 
jury was a mere gratuity, as the issue was not raised 
as a matter of law. 
The evidence is similar in the instant case to that 
before the court in People v. Malone, 117 Cal. App. 629, 
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4 P. 2d 287 (1931), where the court held that no entrap-
ment existed. It is submitted, therefore, that the claim 
of entrapment is not well taken. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant's claims show no basis for reversal of 
his convictions, and it is submitted the conviction should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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